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Decision making under time constraints requires trading off 
between making quick, inaccurate decisions and gathering 
more evidence for more accurate, but slower decisions. 
Under rather general settings, optimal behavior can be 
described by a time-dependent decision bound on the 
decision maker’s belief of being correct1. Such a bound 
corresponds to a bound on the most active neuron in simple 
neural models with two perfectly anti-correlated neurons, 
but only if the reliability of the sensory evidence is time-
invariant. In more realistic neural population codes2 we 
show that the optimal decision bound is on the activity of all 
neurons rather than the previously populated bounds on its 
maximum activity. The theory predicts that the bound on the 
most active neurons would appear to shift depending on the 
firing rate of other neurons in the population, a puzzling 
behavior under the drift diffusion model as it would wrongly 
suggests that subjects change their stopping rule across 
conditions. This theory also applies to the case of time 
varying evidence, a case that cannot be handled by the 
simple two-neuron model.
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Belief in diffusion model only corresponds to performance if
evidence strength is constant over time.
Otherwise diffusion model incapable of tracking correct
sufficient statistics (see next panel).
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e.g. random dot
kinetogram
Fine discrimination,
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Does the brain use a winner-take-all strategy?
Summary
The optimal strategy
Optimal decision making requires
"Two Neural Pools" model fails in both respects
Optimal decision making in PPCs requires the decision
bound to be a function of activity of all neurons in
the population, rather than a bound on maximum activity
Hypothesis might be testable in tasks with
time-varying evidence
time-varying bound on belief of being correct, and
belief that corresponds to probability of being correct
Roitman & Shadlen (2002)
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Activity different between winning & losing integrator only
depends on time
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constant bound
Distinguishing optimal strategy from winner-take-all
Assuming time-invariant evidence strength,
neural activity difference at decision time is roughly function
of time
Optimal strategy well
approximated by constant
bound time-varying "urgency
signal" to all neurons
Is a constant bound biologically convenient, and the brain
uses such approximation?
Is the brain using the optimal strategy, and we just can't
tell the difference?
Time-varying evidence tasks should reveal the difference
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